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Abstract  
Recent studies have shown that a more efficient 
use of airspace may involve shared airspace 
operations, i.e., temporal as well as spatial separation 
of arrival and departure flows [1][2]. Temporal 
separation would permit a departure aircraft to fly 
through an arrival flow, depending on an available 
gap.  This would necessitate careful and precise 
coordination between controllers in different sectors.  
Three methods of coordination which permit the 
penetration of a controller's airspace by another 
controller's aircraft are described:   point out, look-
and-go, and prearranged coordination procedure.  
Requirements of each method are given, along with 
associated problems that have surfaced in the field as 
described by Aviation Safety and Reporting System 
(ASRS) and other reports.  A Human-in-the-Loop 
simulation was designed to compare two of the 
methods:  point out and prearranged coordination 
procedures.  In prearranged coordination procedures 
(P-ACP), the controllers control an aircraft in another 
controller's airspace according to specified 
prearranged procedures, without coordinating each 
individual aircraft with another controller, as is done 
with point outs. In the simulation, three experienced 
controllers rotated through two arrival sectors and a 
non-involved arrival sector of a Terminal Radar 
Approach Control (TRACON) airspace. 
Results of eighteen one-hour simulation runs 
(nine in each of the two conditions) showed no 
impact of the coordination method on separation 
violations nor on arrival times for 208 departing 
aircraft crossing an arrival stream.  Participant 
assessment indicated that although both coordination 
conditions were acceptable, the prearranged 
coordination procedure condition was slightly safer, 
more efficient, timely, and overall, worked better 
operationally.  Problems arose in the point out 
condition regarding controllers noticing acceptance 
of point outs.  Also, in about half of the point-out 
runs, time pressure was felt to have had an impact on 
when and if the departures could cross an arrival 
stream. An additional problem with point outs may 
be confusion in the field about which controller has 
responsibility for separating point-out aircraft from 
other aircraft. 
Background 
Shared Airspace Operations 
Currently most aircraft are spatially separated in 
the National Air Space (NAS).  A more efficient use 
of airspace may involve shared or “hybrid” spacing, 
which consists of both spatial and temporal spacing.  
Operationally, this type of spacing can involve 
sending a departure aircraft through a gap in an 
arrival flow on a more direct route to its 
destination.  This results in the departure aircraft 
traversing an arrival sector's airspace, which requires 
careful coordination between controllers.   
Coordination Procedures 
In general, each controller has a delegated 
airspace, or sector, in the NAS.  Within this airspace, 
the controller has full responsibility for the 
positioning of aircraft and for maintaining minimum 
separation standards.  However, it has sometimes 
been more efficient for a controller from a different 
sector to have this responsibility, i.e., to control an 
aircraft in another controller's airspace.  For example, 
if an aircraft is going through the corner of another 
controller's airspace, it doesn't make sense to make a 
hand-off and transfer radio communication to the 
controller who owns that airspace for the brief time 
that the aircraft will be in that airspace.  The 
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following three methods have evolved to deal with 
these and similar situations:  point outs, look-and-go, 
and prearranged coordination procedure.  Each will 
be discussed in the following sections. 
Point-Outs 
FAA Point-out Requirements 
The FAA defines Point-outs as "A physical or 
automated action taken by a controller to transfer the 
radar identification of an aircraft to another controller 
if the aircraft will or may enter the airspace or 
protected airspace of another controller and radio 
communications will not be transferred."  Point-out 
Approved is "The term used to inform the controller 
initiating a point out that the aircraft is identified and 
that approval is granted for the aircraft to enter the 
receiving controller’s airspace, as coordinated, 
without a communications transfer or the appropriate 
automated system response" [3, p. 241].  Specific 
requirements as listed in the FAA Air Traffic 
Operations Policy 7110.65 (4/3/14) are as follows. 
"a. The transferring controller must: 
1. Obtain verbal approval before permitting 
an aircraft to enter the receiving controller’s 
delegated airspace. [In the terminal], 
automated approval may be utilized in lieu of 
verbal, provided the appropriate automation 
software is operational (automated point out 
function), and the procedures are specified in 
a facility directive/LOA. 
2. Obtain the receiving controller’s approval 
before making any changes to an aircraft’s 
flight path, altitude, speed, or data block 
information after the point out has been 
approved. 
3. Comply with restrictions issued by the 
receiving controller unless otherwise 
coordinated. 
4. Be responsible for subsequent radar 
handoffs and communications transfer, 
including flight data revisions and 
coordination, unless otherwise agreed to by 
the receiving controller or as specified in a 
LOA. 
b. The receiving controller must: 
1. Ensure that the target position corresponds 
with the position given by the transferring 
controller or that there is an association 
between a computer data block and the target 
being transferred prior to approving a point 
out. 
2. Be responsible for separation between 
point out aircraft and other aircraft for which 
he/she has separation responsibility. 
3. Issue restrictions necessary to provide 
separation from other aircraft within his/her 
area of jurisdiction" [3, pp. 244-5]. 
 
The FAA further stipulates that "When receiving 
a handoff, point-out, or traffic restrictions, respond to 
the transferring controller as follows: Radar Contact, 
Point-out Approved,  or Traffic Observed, or Unable" 
[3, p. 242].  Also,  
"When using the term 'traffic' for coordinating 
separation, the controller issuing traffic must 
issue appropriate restrictions. The controller 
accepting the restrictions must be responsible to 
ensure that approved separation is maintained 
between the involved aircraft" [3, p. 242].  
An ideal automated point out interchange in the 
terminal that involves traffic therefore replicates the 
following verbal exchange (the automated procedure 
is in parentheses): 
Controller A:   
"Can I take aircraft through your airspace?" 
(Controller A flashes data tag of aircraft into B's 
airspace—it shows up flashing yellow on B's 
scope.) 
Controller B: 
"I have traffic you'll have to watch out for."  (B 
flashes relevant traffic.  It shows up flashing 
yellow on A's scope.) 
Controller A: 
"I see that and accept responsibility for avoiding 
it."  (A accepts point out of relevant aircraft.  It 
stops flashing but remains yellow.) 
Controller B: 
"Okay, point out approved."  (B accepts original 
point out.  It stops flashing but remains yellow.) 
 
If Controller B does not flash the relevant 
traffic, it is assumed that Controller B will separate 
that traffic from A's point out aircraft.  It can be seen 
that if there is traffic, this is a lengthy and time-
consuming process, and that if not completed 
correctly, it may lead to uncertainty as to which 
controller is in charge of separation in Controller B's 
airspace.   
Problems with Point Outs in the Field 
As reported in the Aviation Safety Reporting 
System, difficulties have been experienced in the 
field with the following aspects of point outs:  
designing point out procedures that take into 
consideration airspace complexity and controller 
workload, training, and tool support.   
A problem with designing adequate point out 
procedures considering controller workload is 
described below.  
"[Controller X] failed to point out . . . to the 
departure sector. I noticed the LJ60 climbing 
into my traffic; I immediately issued a turn to 
180 heading on my F900. . . I have no idea the 
proximity, but it looked close. . . .The X Sector 
is required to do the point out but that sector is 
very often extremely busy running all departures 
and arrivals for both Y airport and Z airport. So 
as it often happens, X is responsible for 
separation of 2 aircraft when he is talking to 
neither one.  I understand it was an error on the 
X controller but it seems we could maybe 
standardize the procedure as it is done 
differently by numerous controllers" [4].  
A problem with airspace design and training is 
described below. 
"I don't know how to discourage the . . . lack of 
point outs. Perhaps [we should] take a similar 
situation in a video replay format and make it 
mandatory training?  . . . Our airspace, as you 
can see from. . . the . . . map, has a lot of cutouts 
and different altitudes for each section. While it 
is impossible to eliminate all the cutouts, it 
should be a goal with future . . . redesign 
projects to simplify the airspace" [5].  
Other ASRS reports on training illustrate the  
confusion about who has responsibility for separating 
point out aircraft from other traffic.   
"Recommendation:  X facility continues to show 
disregard for the meaning of Point Out. Suggest 
X facility gets regular training for Point Outs. It 
appears that they interpret Point Outs as 
permission to enter the Y facility's airspace, but 
are unaware that they are responsible for 
separation of affected aircraft" [6]. 
It should be noted that the above 
recommendation conflicts with the requirements on 
who is responsible for separating point out traffic 
from other traffic as specified by the FAA on the 
previous page.  According to those requirements, it is 
the receiving controller who is "responsible for 
separation between point out aircraft and other 
aircraft for which he/she has separation 
responsibility."  This is the case unless the receiving 
facility has pointed out any conflicting traffic to the 
requestor before accepting the point out.  
Lack of tool support has sometimes caused 
problems with automated point outs.  In one ASRS 
report, a controller made an amendment to an aircraft 
that had been pointed out, and was currently in 
another controller's sector, which caused the 
datablock to fall off the scope of the controller who 
had accepted the point out.   The suggested fixes 
were modification of equipment or procedures, i.e., 
requiring coordination of route amendments between 
facilities [7]. 
In reviewing problems with point outs in the 
field, Ralph Grayson noted in 1981 that    
"most of the point-out reports were similar . . . 
Acceptance of a point-out meant that relevant 
traffic was observed but not under coordinated 
control and, in many instances, its intentions 
were unknown. In situations where coordination 
is needed, the point-out technique can work 
reliably only where there is a framework of 
facility directives that defines coordinated 
operations utilizing point-outs." [8, p. 39]   
Look-and-Go 
Although this is not an FAA-approved 
procedure, it has been used in US airspace [8].  In 
this procedure, "a controller quick-looks the airspace 
being controlled by another, and if he observes no 
traffic pertinent to his plan, he clears the aircraft he is 
controlling into the adjacent airspace" [8, p. 40].   
Problems with Look-and-Go in the Field 
A loss of separation between an Airbus A320 
and a Boeing 737-200 was described in a 1999 
Canadian investigation report where a look-and-go 
procedure was operative in the Calgary Terminal 
Control Unit (TCU) [9]. Although there was a 
procedure for spatially separating arrival and 
departing aircraft, "the controllers favoured a process 
referred to as 'look and go'," which was seen as more 
efficient in maintaining traffic flow.  According to 
the report,  
"The Operations Letter describes 'look and go' as 
a process used to reduce or eliminate 
coordination whereby traffic under control of 
other positions is assessed and further action is 
taken with respect to that traffic."   
The authors of the report note that  
"This procedure requires that the controller 
continuously monitor traffic because the 
separation between departing and arriving 
aircraft may be vertical or lateral."  
According to the report, the departure 
controller's responsibilities of keeping departing 
aircraft clear of the arrival controller's aircraft, 
"although implied in Operations Letter No. 98/20, are 
not explicit."  This ambiguity contributed to the loss 
of separation [9].  Several other near misses as well 
as accidents have resulted from "the lack of 
redundancy that exists when the look-and-go concept 
is in use instead of full scale coordination" [8].  In 
sum, "visual coordination [is] an inadequate form of 
coordination. . .In reality, no coordination [takes] 
place"  [8, p. 41]. Hence there is a need to have many 
more details about coordination procedures than is 
possible in the look-and-go procedure, which leads to 
the next section, Pre-arranged Coordination 
Procedures, or P-ACP. 
Pre-Arranged Coordination Procedure (P-
ACP) 
FAA Requirements  
The FAA describes prearranged coordination as 
"A facility's standardized procedure that describes the 
process by which one controller may allow an aircraft 
to penetrate or transit another controller's airspace in 
a way that assures standard separation without 
individual coordination for each aircraft" [3, p.  566]. 
More detailed specifications are: 
"a. Air traffic managers at radar facilities must 
determine whether or not a clear operational 
benefit will result by establishing prearranged 
coordination procedures (P−ACP). Such 
procedures would allow aircraft under one 
controller’s jurisdiction to penetrate or transit 
another controller’s airspace in a manner that 
assures standard separation without individual 
coordination for each aircraft. When reviewing 
existing P−ACPs, or contemplating the 
establishment of these procedures, consideration 
must be given to airspace realignment to 
preclude coordination/penetration of another 
operational position’s airspace. Prior to 
implementing a P−ACP, negotiations should be 
accomplished locally and all affected personnel 
must be thoroughly trained in the application of 
the procedures.  
b. When P−ACPs are established, a facility 
directive must be published. The directive must 
include, as a minimum: 
1. Requirement that the NAS Stage A (en route) 
or ATTS (terminal) systems are fully 
operational. 
2. Procedures to be applied in the event that 
prearranged coordination procedures are not 
practicable. 
3. The position(s) authorized to penetrate the 
protected airspace of an adjacent position. 
4. Detailed responsibilities relating to P−ACP 
for each position. 
5. The requirement that two positions of 
operation cannot be authorized to penetrate each 
other’s airspace simultaneously. 
6. Controllers who penetrate another controller’s 
airspace using P−ACP must display data block 
information of that controller’s aircraft which 
must contain, at a minimum, the position symbol 
and altitude information. 
7. Controllers who penetrate another controller’s 
airspace using P−ACP must determine whether 
the lead aircraft is a heavy or B757 when 
separating aircraft operating directly behind, or 
directly behind and less than 1,000 feet. 
8. Procedures to be applied for those modes of 
operation when the computer fails or is shut 
down, the beacon fails and only primary is 
available, and for non-beacon aircraft or at 
automated facilities aircraft without an 
associated full data block" [10, p. 105] . 
 
Southern California TRACON (SCT) Example of 
P-ACP  
An example of an area where prearranged 
coordination takes place is in the vicinity of the Los 
Angeles Airport.  Within this area, coordination is 
tightly prescribed between the following SCT 




For example, when LAX is in the West 
configuration, "(1) The Manhattan controller may 
apply P-ACP within the depicted boundaries of Laker 
airspace [shown in Figure 1 above]. (2) Prior to using 
P-ACP, the Manhattan and Laker controllers shall 
Quick Look each other or ensure Full Data Blocks 
are auto displayed to both sectors within P-ACP 
airspace. (3) Manhattan may enter P-ACP airspace 
with aircraft that depart Los Angeles International 
Runways 25L/R, or 24L/R. (4) The Manhattan 
controller shall be responsible for maintaining 
approved separation between aircraft under their 
control and all traffic in the P-ACP airspace" [11]. 
Problems with P-ACP in the Field 
ASRS reports indicate that difficulties have been 
experienced in the field with the following aspects of 
P-ACPs:  design, training, tool support, and 
workload.  A problem with designing adequate P-
ACPs is illustrated by the following ASRS report. 
"The new prearranged coordination procedures 
[at my facility] are incorrect, flawed, and not 
safe. There are no restrictions with regards to 
altitudes, headings, or separation responsibility. 
There are no "right of way" rules defined in the 
prearranged coordination and the separation 
responsibility is unknown. . . This type of 
prearranged coordination is essentially a 
sanctioned form of "look and go," "run and 
gun," "turn and burn." . . . The "prearranged 
coordination procedures" at X need to be 
rewritten by someone who has knowledge and 
experience of prearranged coordination 
procedures" [12]. 
A problem with training P-ACPs is described as 
follows:   
"Once again our facility misapplied prearranged 
coordination procedures, except this time it lead 
to a loss of separation. . . I had previously filed a 
report on the misuse of prearranged coordination 
procedures and a loss of separation between two 
Air Carrier jets, one climbing and the other 
descending.  This is a common occurrence here 
at X and there has been no refresher training 
provided. It is basically jungle rules at times. 
There is plenty of airspace for the Departure 
controllers to climb within their own airspace, 
above or below the arrivals descending via the 
STARs. We are having more and more of these 
types of close calls with no improvement. 
Specialists are not taught to remain in their 
airspace and misapply prearranged coordination 
procedures all the time.  .  . I recommend that 
prearranged coordination procedures. . .be 
suspended/terminated and the controllers [be] 
required to make a point out or stay in their own 
airspace" [13]. 
A problem with tool support of P-ACPs is 
described below.  The auto-displays in STARS were 
not working and yet,  
". . . The auto displays are required in the X 
7110.65 for prearranged coordination climbs in 
designated areas. Without this function people 
are still climbing but do not realize, or are 
forgetting that these aircraft are not properly 
displayed to the appropriate positions, and thus 
the Controller should not be using prearranged 
coordination areas" [14]. 
Finally, even with good design, training, and 
tool support, there are those that say P-ACP increases 
workload.  "I still remain certain that there is an 
increased workload placed upon the RADAR 
Approach/Departure Controller, all over the 
interpretation of 'Pre-arranged Coordination'" [15]. 
Unanswered Questions On Shared Airspace 
Operations and Coordination Procedures  
Given the fact that shared airspace operations 
require precise coordination between controllers, the 
question is, "Which type of coordination—point outs 
or prearranged coordination, is safest, most efficient, 
and does not require undue workload by either 
controller in shared airspace operations?"  Our goal 
was to answer this question by testing these two types 
of coordination in a simulation involving shared 
airspace operations. Each type of coordination would 
adhere to FAA guidelines and have clear and explicit 
rules.   
Method 
Simulated Airspace 
The simulated airspace was in the Northern 
California TRACON (NCT), and was focused on the 
Loupe departures from San Jose Airport (SJC), as 
shown in Figure 1 below.  Instead of all of the Loupe 
departures making the high altitude loop eastward to 
fly above the arrival streams as is currently the case, 
some aircraft flew on a departure that was newly 
created for the simulation—the Reddt3 departure.  
This departure gave the controller two options:  
flying the aircraft under 5,000 feet below the arrivals 
(the safe route), or flying through the arrival streams 
when a sufficient gap was available.  The three 
arrival streams were the Panoche arrival into Oakland 
(OAK), the Modesto arrival into San Francisco 
(SFO), and the Madwin arrival into OAK, as shown 
in Figure 2.  
 
 
Figure 2.  Simulation Airspace  
Experimental Design 
The experiment was a test not only of 
coordination types, but of support tools to help 
controllers decide whether to climb a departure below 
or through arrival streams. (The description and 
results of the different tool sets can be found in an 
accompanying paper presented at this conference 
[16].)  The experiment consisted of 18 one-hour runs, 
with 4-5 runs per day over 4 full days.  The data 
collection days were preceded by a day of training 
and practice runs.  As shown in Figure 3, the 
experiment was a 2x3x3 factorial design with two 
coordination types and three tools tested in three 
different traffic scenarios. Traffic in the scenarios 
was based on actual traffic. The aircraft call signs in 
each of the scenarios were changed each time the 
scenario was presented.  
 
Figure 3.  Experimental Design 
Participants 
Three highly experienced controllers rotated 
through the following arrival positions:   
1. Mulford, who made the decision to fly 
below or through the arrival streams 
with the Reddt3 departures,  
2. Niles, who controlled the Modesto 
arrivals, and  
3. Sunol, who transferred control for the 
Panoche and Madwin arrivals to 
Mulford and who handed off the 
Modesto arrivals to Niles.  
The participants were retired controllers who 
had controlled traffic for an average of 26 years, 14 
years of which were in a TRACON.   The average 
time from retirement was 4.6 years.1   
Coordination  
 A previous simulation showed that having an 
arrival sector control the Reddt3 departures first 
instead of a departure sector reduced the overall 
coordination needed [17].  Early control of the 
aircraft gave the arrival controller more time to make 
a decision on whether to climb the aircraft and 
improved departure climb performance.  
Point outs 
The point out coordination for Mulford and 
Niles, two arrival sectors, was as follows.  Mulford 
had control of the Reddt3 departures on contact after 
they departed SJC. These aircraft needed to go 
through Toga's departure airspace (and possibly 
Niles' airspace, if the decision were made to climb 
them early).  Reddt3 departure's datablocks were 
therefore automatically displayed to the Toga 
departure sector.   Mulford needed to point out each 
Reddt3 departure to Niles (even though the departure 
could have stayed in Mulford's airspace below 
5,000').  Reddt 3 departures needed to stay on the 
Reddt3 departure route.  With point out approval 
from Niles, Mulford could climb Reddt3 departures 
up to 11,000' through Niles' airspace. Niles also 
pointed out relevant traffic on the Modesto arrival to 
Mulford. 
Prearranged Coordination 
As in the point out condition, Mulford had 
control of the Reddt3 departures on contact after 
departing SJC, and again, Reddt3 departure 
1 Five other retired controllers participated in supportive 
positions, some of whom were testing other tools.  SJC Tower 
released Reddt3 aircraft to Mulford, Toga Departure handled the 
SJC Loupe and other departures, Ghost Final received hand-offs 
from Niles and Mulford, Richmond Departure received Mulford's 
Reddt3 hand-offs, and Ghost High, a center controller, received 
hand-offs from Richmond.   
 
datablocks were shown to Toga. In the prearranged 
coordination condition, however, Mulford had 
automatic control for climbing through Niles 
airspace. In this condition, it was clearly specified 
that Mulford needed to ensure separation of Reddt3 
departures from all traffic in Niles' airspace.  Reddt3 
departure datablocks were automatically displayed to 
Niles and datablocks of Modesto arrivals between 
4,000' and 11,000' in Niles' airspace were 
automatically displayed to Mulford. 
Apparatus 
Standard Terminal Automation Replacement 
System (STARS) displays, including automated point 
out capability, were emulated within  Multi Aircraft 
Control System (MACS) software [18], and shown 
on large-format monitors similar to those used in 
current air traffic control facilities. MACS provides a 
high fidelity environment to simulate traffic, test 
tools and procedures, and collect data. In addition, 
the controllers were able to contact other sectors by 
radio communication.   
Workload and Participant Feedback 
During the simulation runs, the controllers were 
prompted every three minutes to report their current 
workload on a scale of 1 to 6 using Workload 
Assessment Keypads (WAKs).  Ratings of 1 and 2 
were considered to be low workload, ratings of 3 and 
4 were considered to be medium workload, and 
ratings of 5 and 6 were considered to be high 
workload. 
After each run, the controllers responded to an 
online post-run survey, and after the simulation, they 
responded to a post-sim survey and participated in a 
debrief. Survey questions included those on 
workload, acceptability, feasibility and safety of the 
operations and coordination.  The questions were 
typically binary (yes/no), or involved ratings on a 5-
point Likert scale, ranging from 1 (lowest) to 5 
(highest). Space was made available for comments on 
both survey instruments. WAK and post-run data 
were analyzed with repeated measures Analyses of 
Variance (ANOVAs). 
                                                     
Results 
Experimental Results 
There were no differences in separation 
violations nor in arrival times at destination points 
between the two coordination conditions.  
Participant Assessments 
Workload and Acceptability of Workload 
Overall, there were some indications that the 
controllers' workload was lower in the P-ACP 
condition than in the point out condition.   
The WAK workload ratings which took place 
every three minutes were low but there were no 
differences in mean ratings between the two 
coordination conditions (1.7 each) for the Mulford 
and Niles positions.   
However, a post-run measure of workload 
showed a slightly higher mean rating for the point out 
condition that fell just short of significance.  This was 
in response to the question "In the last run, how much 
mental activity was required during the busiest time?"  
The ratings from the participant controllers were on a 
five-point scale ranging from "Very low mental 
activity" to "Very high mental activity." As shown in 
Figure 4, the participants’ average rating of their 
mental activity during the busiest time was low to 
moderate, but slightly higher in the point out 
condition (M = 2.5) than in the P-ACP condition (M 
= 2.3).  However, this reached significance only at 
the p = .07 level, (MS = .02, F(1,2) = 12, SEs 
adjusted per Loftus & Masson [19] and Morey [20], 
error bars = 95% CIs.   
 
Figure 4.  Mental Activity 
In the post run survey, there was no difference in 
the coordination conditions on the acceptability of 
workload, which was rated as a 5 (very acceptable) 
on a 1-5 scale on all runs by the three controllers.   
In the post sim survey, however, although all of 
the controllers rated the workload as very acceptable 
in the P-ACP condition, (a 5 on a 1-5 scale), only two 
of the three did so in the point out condition.  One 
controller rated the workload in the point out 
condition as only "Somewhat acceptable,"—a 3 on a 
1-5 scale.   
Efficiency 
As shown in Figure 5, in the post-run survey, 
controllers in the Mulford and Niles positions rated 
the runs in the P-ACP condition as having more 
efficient coordination than the point out condition.  
The ratings were in response to the question "In this 
run, how efficient was the coordination procedure for 
the Reddt3 departures?" (Ms = 3.9 & 5.0, MS = 9.4, 
F(1,15) = 19.0, p <.01, error bars = 95% CIs.)  
 
Figure 5.  Efficiency of Coordination 
As shown in Figure 6, in the post-run survey, the 
controllers in the Mulford and Niles positions rated 
the runs in the P-ACP condition as having more 
timely coordination than the point out condition.  The 
ratings were in response to the question "All in all, in 
this run was the coordination accomplished in a 
timely fashion?" (Ms = 4.2 & 5.0, MS = 2.6, F(1,14) 
= 8.2, p <.01, error bars = 95% CIs.) 
 
Figure 6.  Timeliness of Coordination 
Finally, in response to the post-sim survey 
question, "Which type of coordination do you think 
worked better operationally?", all three controllers 
indicated that the coordination in the P-ACP 
condition worked better operationally.  Their average 
rating is depicted in Figure 7. 
 Figure 7.  Operationally Worked Better 
The participants made the following statements in 
support of their ratings:  "Mulford can see the traffic 
and no sense coordinating when not necessary." 
• "Pre-arranged helps more when traffic is very 
busy." 
• "Regular point outs are more time-consuming 
and cumbersome.  The pre-arranged is much 
cleaner." 
Safety 
 After each run, controllers in the Mulford and 
Niles positions were asked, "In this run, how safe was 
the coordination procedure for the REDDT3 
departures?"  As shown in Figure 8, the controllers 
thought that both procedures were safe, but there 
were more runs, on average, where the controllers 
thought that point outs were less safe.  (Ms = 4.6 & 
5.0, MS = .68, F(1,16) = 7.8, p <.01, error bars = 95% 
CIs.) 
 
Figure 8.  Safety of Coordination  
Also, in the post-sim survey, although all 
controllers thought that coordination and safety were 
“Very acceptable” (5s on a 1-5 scale) in the 
prearranged coordination condition, only two did so 
for the point out condition; one controller thought 
that both safety and coordination in the point out 
condition were only "somewhat acceptable" (3 on a 
1-5 scale). 
When asked to compare the two conditions 
directly in terms of safety, there was a difference of 
opinion.  One controller thought the P-ACP condition 
was much safer, stating "Making point outs and 
phone calls is distracting--could lead to errors." 
Another thought that both conditions were equally 
safe, "They are both safe, just different."  A third 
thought the point out condition was slightly safer, 
saying that point outs "force both controllers to 
answer the other's message."   
Many safety features of the simulation worked 
well in each of the conditions, as revealed in the post-
sim survey.   
In the prearranged coordination condition, 
• Niles was sufficiently alerted to Reddt3 
departures going through Niles' airspace 
(average rating of 5.0 on a 1-5 scale), and 
• The full data blocks displayed to Mulford 
in Niles' airspace were sufficient to show 
Mulford any traffic (average rating of 5.0 
on a 1-5 scale), 
In the point out coordination condition, 
• Niles was sufficiently alerted to  Reddt 3 
departures  going through Niles' 
airspace (average rating of 5.0 on a 1-5 
scale) 
• Niles found it easy to notice Mulford's 
point outs of Reddt3 departures (average 
rating of 4.7 on a 1-5 scale), despite a 
flashing limited datablock. 
Problems with Point outs 
It was sometimes difficult for Mulford and Niles 
to notice when point outs were accepted.  In the post-
run survey, controllers in the Mulford and Niles 
position were asked, "In this run, how difficult was it 
for you to notice when your point outs were accepted 
by the other controller?"  Mean responses for the nine 
point out runs are shown in Figure 9.  Although the 
means are close to the middle of the scale, there were 
some runs with ratings of "Very difficult," or 5 on a 
1-5 scale. A comment from a controller in the 
Mulford position was "Difficult to determine if Niles 
accepted my point out.  I had to redo or call to verify" 
(Run 7). 
 Figure 9.  Noticing Point Out Acceptance 
Mulford indicated that on average, over half the 
time Niles did not point out conflicting traffic, as 
shown in Figure 10.  In the post-run survey, 
controllers in the Mulford position were asked, "In 
this run, if there was traffic that conflicted with the 
Reddt3 departures, did Niles point out this traffic?" 
 
Figure 10.  Pointing Out Conflicting Traffic 
It is possible that Niles did not point out the 
conflicting traffic because he took responsibility for 
separating this traffic from the Reddt3 departures.  
However, in the post-sim survey, two of the 
controllers stated that there were times when Niles 
should have pointed out traffic to Mulford and did 
not.  One of the controllers commented that this also 
happened in the field and better training would solve 
it.   
Perhaps most important, there was time pressure 
on at least one point out coordination in about half 
the point out runs for both Mulford and Niles.  In the 
post-run survey, the controllers were asked, "In the 
last run, was there time pressure on even a single one 
of these coordinations?"  Controllers in each position 
specified that there was time pressure in four of the 
nine runs.  The controller in the Mulford position was 
also asked, "If there was a delay in point out 
coordination, did it have an impact on the Reddt3 
aircraft vertical profile or lateral route?"  For half of 
the point out runs the answer was yes.2   
2 A factor further complicating the point out condition that 
occurred both in the simulation and occurs today in the field is 
that within a TRACON facility there is no way for a controller to 
make an automated point out on an aircraft that has already been 
handed off. In the field, after handing off to a different facility, 
Balancing Workload, Efficiency, and Safety 
A question that required the respondents to 
consider all elements of the two coordination 
procedures at once was the post-sim question:  "If 
you were in charge of implementing shared airspace 
operations in the field, please indicate which method 
of coordination you would put in place:  point outs or 
prearranged coordination procedures?"  All opted for 
prearranged coordination procedures. 
Discussion 
It appears from the review of problems in the 
field that both coordination procedures would benefit 
from tightly prescribed rules that are rigorously 
followed and trained.  Fortunately these requirements 
exist:  the detailed requirements given in the FAA 
7210.3Y [10] for implementing a P-ACP would 
ensure that this procedure would not resemble a 
"Look and Go" procedure.  Especially important is 
the requirement that  
"prior to implementing a P−ACP, negotiations 
should be accomplished locally and all affected 
personnel must be thoroughly trained in the 
application of the procedures."  
Similarly, point out requirements are well-
specified in the 7110.65 [3] although there is 
evidence that point out coordination could be 
improved by a "framework of facility directives" 
specifying their precise meaning as suggested by 
Grayson [8].  The difficulty of executing point outs 
properly in high traffic suggests redesigning airspace 
to minimize point out coordination.  It is important to 
improve training on who is responsible for separating 
approved point out aircraft from other traffic.  
Controller confusion on who has responsibility for 
separating the point out aircraft from other aircraft is 
a safety issue in and of itself.   
this capability is in place.  Therefore, according to a participant in 
the simulation, after handing off within a facility, a controller 
needs to  
“revert to the old method of forcing the data tag onto the 
scope of the person [being shown the point out] and then 
calling them on the landline to make a verbal point out. . . 
Because [controllers] like the automation better than the 
verbal, many . . . will not initiate a handoff until all of their 
point outs have been done with the automation. This often 
leads to handoffs getting made late and sometimes even 
forgotten and can contribute to someone falling behind 
when the traffic is busy.” 
                                                     
                                                                                       
At the beginning of the study,  it  appeared that 
choosing between the two coordination methods 
depended on the importance of timeliness (favoring 
P-ACP) vs. having structured, individual, closed-
loop, and therefore perhaps safer coordination 
(favoring point outs).    
Results from the simulation showed, however, 
that a well-designed and trained prearranged 
coordination procedure not only has the advantages 
of efficiency and timeliness, but was judged in the 
post-run surveys as being safer and appeared to have 
fewer problems overall.  In the end, all of the 
participants said they would choose prearranged 
coordination procedures instead of point outs for 
implementing shared airspace operations in the field.   
Summary  
Recent studies have shown that a more efficient 
use of airspace may involve both spatial and temporal 
spacing of arrival and departure flows.  This would 
involve a high degree of coordination between 
controllers.  Three methods of coordination which 
involve the penetration of a controller's airspace by 
another controller's aircraft were described:   point 
out, look-and-go, and prearranged coordination.  
Procedural requirements of each method were given, 
along with problems that have surfaced in the field as 
described by ASRS and other reports. 
Two of the methods were compared in a 
simulation:  point out and prearranged coordination 
procedure.  Results of eighteen one-hour simulation 
runs (nine in each of the two conditions) showed no 
impact of the coordination method on separation 
violations and arrival times at destination points.  
Participant assessment indicated that although both 
coordination conditions were acceptable, the 
prearranged coordination procedure condition was 
seen as slightly safer, more efficient, timely, and 
overall as working better operationally.  Problems 
arose in the point out condition regarding controllers 
noticing acceptance of point outs, as well as the time 
pressure that was felt to have had an impact on the 
Reddt3 departures in about half of the point-out runs.  
An additional problem with point outs may be 
controller confusion in the field about who has 
responsibility for separating point-out aircraft from 
other aircraft. 
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